i\1ichigan Law Review [VoL 88:1759 action. But it also appears that whatever great actions we undertake today involve such an increase in complexity that we act generally with less knowledge than we would like to have, even if with more than we once had. [p. 7] Though far from original, 3 Glazer's general point seems correct. De veloping effective public policies can require a considerable body of knowledge about complex social behavior. We do not yet have the information or the cognitive tools needed to make completely accu rate predictions about this behavior, and until we do our social policy will remain, at least in this sense, limited.
A second limit on social policy, according to Glazer, is the inher ent tendency of government social programs to replace "traditional" ways of coping through the family, church, ethnic group, neighbor hood, and voluntary organization (pp. 7, 91, 103, 114, 139, 141-43).
Social policy "weakens the position of these traditional agents and fur ther encourages needy people to depend on the government for help rather than on the traditional structures" (p. 7). Glazer argues that the strength of these traditional structures is essential in today's soci ety (pp. 140-46) and that social policy can, at best, achieve only lim ited success because it displaces these structures. Although Glazer unfortunately leaves unexplored many questions about these tradi tional structures,4 he is surely right to acknowledge that government social policies affect -often in unintended and undesirable wayspreexisting social relationships.
Glazer illustrates the limitations on social policy by examining the history of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, commonly known as "welfare." In focusing on welfare, however, Glazer may be seen as picking apart a straw man. After all, almost nobody is satisfied with welfare. 5 Conservatives think it breeds depen-3. Robert Merton, for example, pointed out the knowledge-based limitation on social policy in 1936. Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, 1 AM. Soc. REV.
(1936).
4. Considering just one example of a "traditional structure" -the family -a number of questions arise which Glazer neglects to address. The first set of questions are definitional ones.
Since the family as a social institution has changed dramatically throughout history, in what sense does Glazer use the term "traditional"? Is the "traditional" fa mily merely an economic unit? A source of emotional support and identity? Two parents living with their children? Is a single-parent fa mily a "traditional structure" for Glazer? Even if we can resolve these defini tional questions, another, more evaluative, set of questions emerges. Might not a given social policy be worth adopting even though it might affect the "traditional structure" of the family?
Although welfare support for single mothers, for instance, is often cited as encouraging families to break up, might many of these families already have been near the breaking point? Although
Glazer may very well answer these last two questions in the negative, by not responding to such sorts of questions he fa ils to justify as adequately as he could his claim that social policy is inherently limited because it affects "traditional structures." dency. Liberals think it is inadequately funded. And welfare recipi ents find that it fosters stigmatization and humiliation. Glazer therefore finds that welfare quite easily supports his contention about the limited nature of social policy.6 For Glazer's purposes, though, welfare serves less as a straw man and more as a worst-case scenario of the liberal view of social policy. Despite "heady hopes" in the 1960s that government and social science could win the War on Poverty, the number of poor in the United States, for wh�tever reason, 7 actually increased as government programs expanded.
The best way to deal with poverty or any other social problem, Glazer urges, is to strengthen the "traditional," or "fine," structures of society.8 However, it is not at all clear from The Limits of Social Pol icy how we can do this. Glazer himself admits that "[ d]espite every effort to adapt social policy to the needs of the fine structure[s] of soci ety, one senses, with some gloom, that it is not an easy task. It is easier to recognize these needs symbolically than to do something about them in concrete policy" (p. 146).
One way to begin to do something about them, says Glazer, is to "think of ways to meet needs with a lesser degree of dependence on public action" (p. 139). Toward this end, Glazer advocates market oriented policies such as education or housing vouchers (pp. 109-11 ), privatization of social services (pp. 125-26), and reliance on voluntary and private philanthropic efforts (p. 139). Glazer does not, though, call for a complete dismantling of government programs. Indeed, he finds attractive a variety of proposals for new government programs, including income allowances for children (p. 92), free health care for children (p. 92), universal catastrophic medical insurance (p. 93), and health insurance and disability benefits for all workers (pp. 34, 96).
Glazer steers clear, however, of supporting any one single public program that claims to solve all or most social maladies. This is one of 6. Glazer would have had a much harder time demonstrating his thesis had he chosen to focus on Social Security. Although Social Security has had problems of its own, it has succeeded in providing for many retired and disabled workers and their families and is widely supported by the public. See, e.g .. his main points: social problems are too complex to expect that they will be solved by uniform, national programs. Instead, social policies should be diverse and decentralized if they are to address effectively the varied problems in society (p. 1 02). The problem of poverty illus trates this point well, for to speak of poverty in the United States is really to speak of many different social problems. Although many people associate poverty with the urban ghetto underclass, the under class actually comprises only a small percentage of the poor in the United States.9 Poverty is actually a mixed bag. America has serious poverty in rural as well as urban areas; in two-parent as well as single parent families; and among workers as well as the unemployed. It is unrealistic to believe that any one program could eliminate all these types of poverty. In demonstrating this fallacy, The Limits of Social Policy offers a useful reminder to adapt social policies to the varied conditions underlying social problems.
The main shortcoming of Glazer's book, however, lies in its failure to treat politics explicitly as a limitation on social policy. No list of the limits of social policy could be complete without including polit ical factors, which undoubtedly act as a major constraint on socialand especially welfare-policy in the United States. After all, it took Congress until 1988 to reform a welfare system that had been devel oped twenty years ago and has had evident problems ever since. Although at various points throughout his book Glazer makes more or less oblique references to public opinion and other political aspects of the policymaking process, he fails to acknowledge the full importance of political and institutional constraints on policymak ing.13 This failure results, at least partly, from Glazer's reaction 9. See, e.g., D. ELLWOOD, su pra note 5, at 193 (dispelling myth that poverty is prima1·ily concentrated in the urban underclass by noting that less than seven percent of the poor live in urban ghettos). against a view that blames the political system entirely for unresolved social ills (p. 3). Instead of indicting politicians for the failure to solve social problems, Glazer sees the failure as one that is inherent in social policy, owing to a lack of knowledge and to unintended impacts on the traditional structures of society. Glazer is certainly not incorrect in claiming that these are limits on social policy; however, in asserting that these are essentially the only limits, he falls victim to a false di chotomy between policy and politics.
Policy cannot be divorced from politics because "the shape of a policy is influenced by the institutional context within which it is formed."14 Thus, even if we had perfect knowledge and could design a policy that we would be certain would strengthen society, our ability to implement that policy would be limited by the political process. Although Glazer may be correct, for example, in supporting a pro gram of universal health insurance, adopting and implementing such a program will be constrained by a political environment that has re sisted such proposals for many years. 15 Good ideas simply do not become social policy all on their own. Political and institutional conditions not only can keep good ideas from becoming law, they can also keep them from ever reaching the national lawmaking agenda. 16 Even when a fairly good idea does be come law, political conditions may lead to its repeal, as has recently occurred with the catastrophic health insurance program for the eld erly. 17 Recognizing the political constraints on policymaking is not necessarily to "blame" the political system for social ills, but rather is to recognize the reality in which social policy must be formulated. To be complete, Glazer's book should have included an explicit and sys tematic discussion of political and institutional constraints.
Despite this shortcoming, The Limits of Social Policy belongs on the reading lists of lawyers, judges, and others involved in setting and implementing social policy. Glazer's skeptical perspective is healthy, even though not everyone will agree with his specifi c criticisms.18
1Vichigan Law Review (VoL 88:1759 Those who dispute Glazer's assertions about the exact limits of social policy, will undoubtedly agree that some limits do exist. The strength of The Limits of Social Policy lies in its well-argued reminder that our ability to shape social behavior and alleviate social strife is not un bounded. Policies have unintended and often unforseen consequences. Society is continually changing, thus making any social knowledge tentative at best. These lessons from Glazer's book should make law yers more circumspect about the capacity of law in general and courts in particular to effect positive social change. The fact that there are limits to our ability to solve social problems, however, should not lead to despair or inaction. Instead, by recognizing that there are limits to governmental policy, lawyers, judges, and legislators can better har ness the possibilities that do exist for effective and worthwhile social policy.
-Cary Coglianese catastrophic medical insurance (p. 93), and health and disability insu1ance for all workers (pp.
13, 34, 50, 96). Such inconsistencies are perhaps to be expected in a book comprised of essays spanning 20 years; yet they nevertheless demonstrate that one may agree that there are limits to social policy but still disagree about where those limits lie.
